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In July 2012, at the height of the financial turbulence in the Eurozone, Mario Draghi announced that within its mandate, the ECB 
would do ‘whatever it takes’ to save 
the Euro. The Euro was ‘irreversible’. 
Yields on peripheral bonds should 
reflect that unshakeable commitment. 
To buttress it, the ECB promised 
to purchase government bonds 
on secondary markets in unlimited 
amounts, a programme known as 
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT). 
The ECB would become, in effect - 
albeit indirectly and conditionally - the 
Eurozone’s lender of last resort. 
By all accounts, ‘Draghi’s bazooka’, 
without being tr iggered, had an 
immediate and significant impact – 
reducing government bond yields not 
only for Greece but also for Italy and 
Spain. It was as a result of this promise 
– and not any programme of austerity – 
that ailing Eurozone states could again 
borrow at ‘rational’ rates of interest, and 
that fears of financial contagion were 
assuaged. 
But was Draghi’s weapon fully licensed? 
There were serious doubts, and these 
were translated into a constitutional 
challenge in Germany, headed by the 
Eurosceptic politician Peter Gauweiler, 
who took the case to the German 
Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe. 
OMT, it was argued, was ultra vires as 
a matter of both European and German 
constitutional law, falling outside the 
competence of the ECB. 
The German court agreed with the 
complainants and, in accordance with 
its legal duty under EU law, referred the 
case to the European Court of Justice for 
a preliminary ruling. This was more of a 
threat than a question, however, with 
the German court signposting OMT’s 
illegality along with an interpretation of 
OMT that would render it Kosher but 
also, by many accounts, impotent. 
On 16th June 2015, the European Court 
of Justice delivered its long-awaited 
ruling. In a rebuff to the German Court, 
the ECJ gave OMT the green light, 
rejecting the conditions Karlsruhe had 
demanded, and indicating its own 
ultimate authority over the matter. If 
Karlsruhe’s challenge was a bluff, it had 
been called. 
Because of the nature of the EU’s judicial 
architecture, the case now returns to 
Karlsruhe, where the German justices 
are faced with a dilemma: back down 
and risk the loss of any remaining aura of 
constitutional omnipotence or fight their 
ground and risk outright constitutional 
conflict with the ECJ. 
The EU’s teleology
Although it will be interesting as a matter 
of judicial relations to see how Karlsruhe 
responds, more significant is what the 
saga reveals about the contradiction at 
the heart of the constitution of Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU), and - given 
the centrality of EMU to the project of 
integration (‘if the Euro fails, Europe 
fails’) – at the heart of Europe itself. 
To simplify a complex constitutional 
predicament, the justification for OMT 
depends on a claim accepted by the ECJ 
but rejected by the German Court: the 
‘Euro is irreversible’. This contradiction 
reveals a fault-line at the core of the 
project of integration, bringing into open 
conflict two opposed understandings 
of what it means to belong to the Euro 
– and to the EU: the first based on a 
functionalist teleology and the second 
an ordo-liberal rulebook. 
The first suggests a dynamic process of 
integration through steps of ‘de facto 
solidarity’ and functional spill-over 
from economic to political integration 
(the end justifies the means). This 
applies to monetary unity just as to 
market integration, the Euro acting as 
a centripetal force for the countries of 
the Eurozone, as well as others set to 
join - a logic that was accepted by the 
financial markets in the run up to the 
single currency when interest rates on 
government borrowing across the area 
converged. It would also push towards 
the rescue of states if they ran into 
difficulty – hence towards OMT, along 
with other rescue programmes such as 
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). 
Whether this is conceived as a moral, 
political or constitutional duty matters 
little. Integration is unstoppable.
The second insists on establishing clear 
constitutional lines between politics 
and economics through guarantees of 
separation between the state and market 
(the means justifies the ends). In this view, 
EMU was constituted substantively on the 
basis of German ordo-liberal ideology. 
The European Central Bank would be 
‘the most independent central bank in 
the world’; its remit would be much 
narrower than the Bank of England or the 
Federal Reserve. Accordingly, its primary 
aim would be to secure price stability, 
catering to German fears of inflation. 
And the logic of action within and across 
EMU would be the avoidance of moral 
hazard: there would be neither monetary 
financing of the budget by the ECB, nor 
solidarity between Member States, as 
both would undermine the incentive to 
prudent economic management. 
If both functional and ordo-liberal logics 
motivated the project in tandem since the 
outset, and could be sustained without 
conflict in normal times, they became 
increasingly fractious in post-crisis 
Europe. As OMT reveals, the tension is 
now palpable: irreversibility can only be 
maintained for each and every state if the 
Eurozone is willing to protect its weakest 
members. Solidarity, however, is a term 
that falls on deaf ears to those who insist 
on a philosophy that prizes efficiency 
and economic discipline above all else. 
Which will triumph? The functionalist 
teleology of Euro irreversibility that 
mandates solidarity or the normativist 
logic of ordo-liberalism that proscribes 
it? Telos or nomos?
The answer so far, as so often, has 
been a fudge, the circle squared with a 
deceptively simple formula: rescue with 
conditionality. Debtor states (and in turn 
the banks that funded them) would be 
rescued, but only on strict conditions of 
public austerity (and relatively little in 
the way of banking reform). This was 
given a judicial seal of approval by the 
ECJ in Pringle, and a constitutional seal of 
approval by way of Treaty Amendment, 
in article 136 TFEU, formalizing the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM). 
Tying loans to adjustment programmes 
would be a way to ensure both rescue 
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and austerity, avoiding moral hazard by 
ensuring that bailed-out states would 
act as if under market pressure to 
maintain sound finances. The loss of fiscal 
autonomy would fit a broader strategy, 
encapsulated in the Fiscal Compact, 
to frame the crisis narrative as one of 
public debtor profligacy rather than 
private creditor irresponsibility, penalizing 
taxpayers rather than banks, and labour 
rather than capital.
The fudge was not ideologically or 
politically neutral. It contributed to the 
‘greatest bait and switch in history’, 
turning a crisis of imprudent northern 
banks into one of profligate southern 
states. This was a class-specific switch, 
privi leging those with assets and 
punishing those – invariably the weakest 
and most vulnerable in society - who rely 
on public services and social solidarity. 
Conditioning bail-outs on austerity also 
maintained the fiction that austerity was 
rationally demanded - despite all the 
evidence to the contrary. 
Contesting the Euro
When Syriza was elected in January 2015 
on a specifically anti-austerity but pro-
European platform – not only as a matter 
of public policy, but also as a matter of 
political ideology – the fudge was sorely 
tested. As a result of its explicitly social 
democratic programme, and its willingness 
to confront its European partners, battle 
lines took shape. Positions were clarified.
On one side was Syriza itself, buttressed 
not only by an election mandate and 
an overwhelming domestic popular 
vote in the Oxi referendum (rejecting 
the bail-out conditions proposed by 
Merkel & co), but also by a phalanx of 
Nobel Prize winning economists and 
decorated public intellectuals. We were 
reminded not only that austerity was 
economically irrational (for Greeks as 
well as for creditors, if the overall long-
term goal is to maximize returns) and that 
Greek debt was unsustainable (a position 
eventually conceded publically even by 
the IMF), but also that Germany’s export 
led strategy had benefitted from cheap 
credit elsewhere, and that historically the 
relationship between debtors and creditors 
is a complex one.
On the other side was a German-led 
bloc of nations, with diverse reasons 
for wanting to avoid any deal that 
seemed generous to the Greeks: some 
pushed by an increasingly nationalist 
domestic agenda; some adopting a 
calculated strategy and rational act of 
punishment to deter Syriza imitators, 
most significantly perhaps, Podemos in 
Spain; others reluctant to permit relaxation 
of a programme that had been inflicted 
on their own people. This position was 
buttressed by fewer intellectuals, but 
was solidified by the trio of Brussels men 
heading the EU institutions (Juncker, 
Dijsselbloem and Tusk), despite the 
extraordinary sluggish economic recovery 
and human cost of austerity in the 
Eurozone.
Against this background, the ECJ’s ruling 
on OMT was lost in the political fog of 
war. Clear enough, however, was that 
it was trying to have its cake and eat it: 
fears about the break-up of the Euro were 
‘unjustified’ but so were German concerns 
that OMT would bypass austerity, as 
any actual bond-buying would only 
be permitted for a country already in 
an adjustment programme. The ECB’s 
authority could be maintained, along with 
the Euro’s unity, and – crucially - without 
jeopardising the ordo-liberal principles 
of EMU.
But as events transpire, both integrationist 
and ordoliberal pillars look to be made 
of alabaster. Less than a month after the 
ECJ delivered its OMT ruling, German 
Finance Minister Schaüble put ‘Grexit’ 
on the table, or rather on the back of 
an envelope, signaling willingness and 
some preparation to reverse the Euro, at 
least for one country. The functionalist 
teleology, captured by the motto of ‘ever 
closer union’, has fatally been called into 
question by the German hegemon. 
If the myth of irreversibility is shattered, 
so are the ordoliberal rules of the game. 
The threat of ‘Grexit’ itself opens up a 
pandora’s box given the lack of exit 
procedures. And little noted is that OMT 
does potentially bypass conditionality, 
working (as in Spain and Italy) without 
any adjustment programme officially 
having been triggered, a fact conveniently 
ignored by the ECJ. 
Whether in the framework of budgetary 
surveillance and sanction, in the new 
programme of Quantitative Easing, or 
in the ECB’s strategic use of threats to 
freeze liquidity in Greece, legal norms and 
forms are bypassed or mutated in order 
to further the project of integration, now 
in a conspicuously authoritarian manner. 
But the ideology of austerity is maintained. 
To what end? If it looks as if Greece’s 
left-wing government was ‘punished’, 
this is less because of its profligacy and 
more because of its temerity to challenge 
the dominant ideology. In what looks 
like conceding the futility of this fight 
in current conditions, Tsipras ultimately 
seemed to conclude - in full harmony with 
neo- and ordo-liberal rhetoric - that there 
was after all, ‘no alternative.’ At what cost 
to the idea of democracy?
The rules of the game
It is important at this point to raise a 
counter-argument. Each member of 
the Euro-group was democratically 
representing its own constituency, many 
of whom had put themselves through 
harsh austerity programmes. Why should 
Greece be spared? Wasn’t there some 
truth to the German joke that Greece was 
like a household voting to refuse repaying 
its mortgage to the bank?
Aside from the dis-analogy between 
h o u s e h o l d s  a n d  g o v e r n m e n t s , 
encouraged by rhetoric about frugal 
Swabian housewives, and the misleading 
implication that all countries can have 
economic policies like Germany, the 
negotiations were perplexing. Would 
rational interstate bargaining really 
mandate further austerity, reducing the 
pie from which creditors would be repaid? 
It was curious that the EU institutions, 
entrusted to safeguard the European 
interest as a whole, sang from the same 
hymn sheet as the pro-austerity national 
governments.
To be sure, the Euro-group could 
not legitimately entertain any openly 
redistributive programme even if this 
would have been the most rational and 
justifiable course of action. The European 
institutions are not structured in a manner 
that legitimises overt redistributive politics. 
The Euro-group, a shadowy institution, 
anyway exists above the rules, as 
caustically noted by its own President. 
But to focus on this institutional gap 
alone misses a broader point about the 
current relation between democracy and 
capitalism. Redistributive policies are 
obstructed by the frameworks of neo- and 
ordo-liberalism - except, it seems, those 
that benefit the wealthy. In the current 
skirmish between solidarity and austerity, 
there is, so far at least, a clear winner. 
Although OMT does nothing to change 
that, in bringing constitutional conflict 
between the ECJ and the German Court 
into the open, it shows that interpretation 
of the rules of the Euro game is now 
systemically contradictory. The battle for 
the Euro is far from over.
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